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Abstract 
We develop a measure of (hybrid) defined benefit (DB) pension risk and show how this 
pension risk affects individual portfolio decisions. We find that people in riskier DB plans 
are, on average, not only less likely to hold equity but also hold a smaller share of their 
wealth in equity. This relation is stronger for people who are better informed about their 
pension plan risk, and for retirees. We also check whether pension risk is related to 
retirement decisions but find no evidence to support this hypothesis. Our main results are 
robust to a number of model specifications and alternative explanations. Our findings 
suggest that properly funded DB pension plans can increase participants’ welfare by 
allowing them to seek higher returns in their individual portfolios while at the same time 
relieving less sophisticated participants from the decisions required by a defined 
contribution plan. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the lessons of the current financial crisis is that no one is safe from asset price 
declines. This is true even for those who do not participate directly in the stock market, 
since their pension savings may also be exposed to asset price shocks. While the link 
between asset prices and defined contribution (DC) plans is straightforward, the pensions 
of defined benefit (DB) plan participants are also exposed to financial risk. DB pension 
funds also suffer stock market losses and increasingly lay the burden of these losses on 
their participants through lower indexation, contribution increases, and even cuts in 
benefits and pension accruals. This is particularly true when the DB plan has evolved from 
a traditional DB arrangement into a hybrid DB scheme. Such hybrid schemes are currently 
in place in various countries, such as the Netherlands, Canada, Luxembourg, and 
Switzerland, and in most of these countries DB and hybrid DB schemes have the largest 
asset  share (OECD Global Pension Statistics for 2011). In the United Kingdom alone 
more than 7.8 million people save for retirement in DB plans.1 Yet, for all its importance, 
we know little about how individuals respond to the risks in their DB pension savings. Are 
DB pension plan participants aware of the risk their pension savings bear? And do they 
react to such risk? 
In this paper we develop a time-varying pension-fund-specific measure of (hybrid) DB 
pension risk from the perspective of the pension plan contributors and beneficiaries and 
analyze their reactions to variations of such risk. In particular, we analyze how people 
adjust their individual portfolio allocations to financial equity and their intended retirement 
age in reaction to changes in their pension risk. Our empirical analysis is based on the 
pension system of the Netherlands. Dutch retirement plans have three characteristics that 
provide excellent grounds for answering our research question. First, for the Dutch, DB 
                                                 
1 National Association of Pension Funds (United Kingdom), retrieved June 28, 2013, from 
http://www.napf.co.uk/PolicyandResearch/Policy_topics/Defined_Benefit_Pensions.aspx. 
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plans are the main tool for saving for retirement, next to first pillar pensions (state-
provided pay-as-you-go funded pension benefits). The DB nature of these plans implies 
that any risk taken by the pension fund will not be directly compensated for by higher 
pensions for the participants, with the exception of foregone benefit indexation. Second, 
since the dot-com crisis at the beginning of this century, Dutch retirement plans have 
evolved from traditional DB into hybrid DB plans. Pension benefits are still linked to 
wages, but the indexation of benefits to inflation is now conditional on the pension fund’s 
financial position and is therefore linked to financial market developments (Ponds and van 
Riel, 2009). This change has increased the market risk sustained by DB plan participants. 
Third, employees cannot freely choose the pension fund to which they contribute; each 
organization or sector has a pre-assigned pension fund for all its employees. This 
institutional feature makes it impossible for people to switch pension funds if they are 
dissatisfied with the fund’s risk strategy or performance but do not want to move to a job 
in another firm or sector of industry. Therefore, Dutch workers only have their own asset 
holdings and retirement age as means to optimize their financial risk exposure.2 
We use uniquely matched data on pension fund performance from the Dutch National 
Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank, or DNB) and a representative survey of the individual 
savings and investments of Dutch households, the DNB Household Survey (DHS). The 
pension fund’s performance data allow us to calculate our measure of pension fund risk, 
which we match and correlate with a rich set of characteristics and observed behavior at 
the individual level found in the household survey data. 
Consistent with the intuition presented above, our results show that people who face 
more pension risk are less likely to invest in financial equity. This finding holds for the 
                                                 
2 The hybrid DB and no-choice policy of pension funds in the Netherlands facilitates our analyses, but it does not mean 
that our results are relevant only for countries where there is no free pension fund choice. Our results apply to any market 
with DB pensions and pension fund-switching-costs, as long as people recognize or are made aware that their DB 
pensions carry some risk. 
3 
 
decision to hold equity—the extensive margin—as well as the share of wealth invested in 
equity—the intensive margin. Also consistent with our behavioral hypothesis, we find that 
the impact of pension risk is generally strongest for those who are aware of their pension 
indexation status (and thus more likely to be aware of their DB pension risk), as well as for 
retirees. We find no conclusive evidence that people adjust their retirement age decision in 
response to pension risk. We show that these results are robust to several model 
specifications and modifications of our estimation methodology and present evidence 
supporting their behavioral validity. 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to quantify individual portfolio reactions 
to DB pension fund risk. Most of the current literature on individual pension decisions is 
focused on whether people are capable of optimal decision making when it comes to 
saving for retirement, particularly when allocating their DC pension wealth (e.g., 
individual retirement accounts and 401(k) accounts). Benartzi and Thaler (2001, 2007) 
show that people are excessively passive when making these investment decisions and 
often fall prey to naïve diversification strategies when managing their retirement portfolios. 
Consistent with this evidence, van Rooij et al. (2007) show that the Dutch, if given a 
choice, would mostly prefer DB over DC schemes to avoid having to make complicated 
pension-related decisions. These studies, however, have little to say about those in DB 
plans, where the investment decisions are made for them.  
Samwick and Skinner (2004) and Poterba et al. (2007) argue that, in the United States, 
everyone but the most risk-averse people would prefer DC plans, even though they are 
riskier and more likely to end up yielding extremely low pensions. Their model 
assumptions and data, however, do not account for the fact that the lower risk offered by 
DB plans allows people to take more risk and improve their returns on their own portfolios, 
which can increase their retirement wealth. Our results show that people are able to 
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identify the risk in DB pension funds and hold more equity when their pension risk is low. 
A good understanding of these phenomena can help in the choice of pension scheme 
policies and shows the advantages of properly designed hybrid DB schemes that, while 
financially sustainable, can also greatly increase individual welfare. 
We further contribute to the literature on optimal reaction to background risk. Our 
results can be easily understood in the context of background risk diversification: When 
people are exposed to background risk on one asset in their portfolio, they adjust by taking 
on less risk in their other assets.3 Heaton and Lucas (2000) calibrate the relation between 
background risk and individual portfolios.4 These authors, among others, tackle the issue 
of background risk by calibrating optimal individual decisions under different kinds of 
market frictions and in the presence of tradable and non-tradable risk. By directly 
observing the decisions of people facing such risks, we make a positive rather than a 
normative assessment of their reactions. Curcuru et al. (2010) provide direct evidence of 
the relation between types of background risk and individual portfolio allocations and 
briefly address pension risk by showing that participation in a DB plan essentially has no 
relation to stock ownership. However, the authors use only a crude measure of pension risk 
(contributing to a DC or DB plan) and, since they do not focus on pension-related 
background risk, pay no further attention to the issue. Guiso et al. (1996) and Rosen and 
Wu (2004), among others, show that individuals adjust their portfolios in the presence of 
background risks such as labor and health, but these studies also ignore background risk in 
pension holdings. Our focus on the financial behavior of people who face measurable DB 
pension risks and our method of measuring such risks are unique in the field. 
                                                 
3 Our results are also consistent with the framework of risk vulnerability, as introduced by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) 
and Gollier and Pratt (1996). The core idea is that risky assets will be less attractive for people forced to bear an unfair 
background risk (i.e., with a non-positive expected value and uncorrelated with other assets they hold). To the extent that 
DB pension risk is similar to an unfair background risk from the perspective of the participants, our results fit this theory. 
4 They also make an extensive review of the literature on background risk and portfolio choice. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the Dutch 
pension system and introduces our measure of DB pension risk. Section 3 describes our 
data and our empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our main results, discusses some 
heterogeneous effects that support our identification strategy, and describes the various 
robustness analyses we performed. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. DB pension risk and the Dutch pension system 
 
In the Netherlands all workers are obliged to participate in their employers’ occupational 
pension plans. Moreover, some employers are obliged to participate in pension plans that 
are shared by entire sectors of industry. As a result, there is a very high participation of 
workers in Dutch pension funds from an international perspective, and a relatively high 
replacement ratio (OECD, 2011). The drawback is that employees cannot opt out of their 
pension fund, even when it is performing poorly. 
The capitalization of Dutch occupational pension funds is among the world’s highest 
(146% of the gross domestic product in 2011, according to DNB statistics). While many 
countries have witnessed a shift from traditional DB plans to DC plans, this has hardly been 
the case in the Netherlands. One of the reasons for the success of the Dutch pension system 
is the willingness of both employers and unions to adjust the traditional DB pension scheme 
to changing circumstances (Sleijpen, 2009). This practice goes back to the beginning of this 
century, following the dot-com crisis, which eroded the value of pension fund assets. After 
this crisis, the indexation of pension benefits to prices or wages became dependent on the 
financial position of the pension fund. This financial position is measured through the 
funding ratio, the value of the fund’s assets divided by the value of its pension liabilities.5 
                                                 
5 The dot-com crisis also resulted in other changes, such as a shift from final-pay schemes to average-wage schemes.  
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The changes in pension plan conditions, as agreed upon by employers and unions, were 
implemented in the Pension Law 2007, which changed a number of pension fund 
regulations. First, it introduced market valuation of assets and liabilities.6 Second, it allowed 
pension benefits to be cut if 1) the funding ratio drops below the minimum 105% required 
by law7 and does not recover after three years and 2) if other recovery measures cannot be 
resorted to (ultimum remedium).8 Third, it determined that each pension fund should hold 
(solvency) reserves that depend on the riskiness of the pension fund’s asset mix. These 
solvency reserves are a key element of our measure of pension fund risk. However, since 
they were only introduced in 2007, we have no way to measure pension risk with our tool 
before that year. 
Solvency reserves, operating through the so-called required funding ratio, are an 
important element of our measure of pension fund risk. Since 2007, pension funds have 
been required to hold additional reserves above the so-called minimum required funding 
ratio designed to cushion potential shocks in the (developed and emerging) equity markets, 
the real estate market, private equity investments, as well as interest rates fluctuations, credit 
risk, and exchange rate risk. The size of the solvency reserves required for each fund 
depends on their own exposure to each of these markets, as well as on the correlations 
between these shocks. The underlying (standard) solvency model, as laid down in the 
Pension Law 2007 and used by pension funds to determine their solvency reserves, is 
calibrated such that the probability of a pension fund being underfunded at a one-year 
horizon is less than 2.5%.9 The required funding ratio is then defined as the funding ratio 
                                                 
6 Since the Pension Law 2007, pension liabilities have been valued by using risk-free market interest rates to reflect their 
duration. In practice, swap rates are used as a proxy for risk-free interest rates. 
7 Following the IORP Directive (2003/41/EC) of June 3, 2003. 
8 Due to the financial crisis, it was decided in 2008 to temporarily extend this three-year recovery period to five years. 
Nevertheless, a number of Dutch pension funds have had to reduce their benefits and accruals (DNB, 2013). 
9 The size of the shocks to each asset class and the correlations between these shocks have been calibrated using historical 
data and the solvency requirements are calculated based on this model in a Value-At-Risk type of analysis. For instance, 
for equity holdings, pension funds have to assume a shock of 25% (for developed markets). This means that a pension fund 
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resulting from the minimum 105% funding plus the additional solvency requirements. The 
model directly translates lower risks into lower required reserves, since the required buffer 
will be smaller. In other words, the lower the riskiness of the pension fund, the lower the 
required funding ratio will be. In 2006, the underlying standard solvency model was 
calibrated such that the required funding ratio would be 130% for the average Dutch 
pension fund. Toward the end of 2010, the average required funding ratio amounted to 
approximately 122% (DNB, 2011), since most pension funds decreased the riskiness of their 
portfolios. 
The contribution and indexation policies of most Dutch pension funds regarding are 
based on so-called policy ladders (Ponds and van Riel, 2009). Policy ladders describe the 
deterministic dependency of contribution rates and indexation rates on the funding ratio. A 
typical indexation policy ladder is shown in Figure 1, where there is no indexation below a 
funding ratio of 105% and full indexation above 130%. Typically, full indexation is 
provided when the funding ratio is at or above the required funding ratio. If the funding ratio 
is over 100% in real terms, then indexation that was not previously provided can be restored 
and contribution rates can be reduced. The latter is legally possible only after prior 
indexation has been fully restored. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The required funding ratio relative to the actual funding ratio is a good measure of 
perceived DB pension risk. If the actual funding ratio is greater than the required one, the 
fund’s financial position is comfortable and the full indexation of pension benefits is not in 
                                                                                                                                                      
with an outstanding equity of 100 will have to hold a solvency requirement with respect to equity market risk of 25. The 
assumed correlations between shocks usually lead to somewhat lower solvency requirements for equity holdings. More 
information about the model can be found at http://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/en/2/51-202140.jsp.  
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doubt; the pension fund’ perceived riskiness is low from the point of view of plan 
participants. The reverse is true when the required funding ratio is greater than the actual 
funding ratio. In that case there is no indexation or only partial indexation and even a risk of 
cutting pension benefits and increasing contributions. In that case, the pension fund’s 
perceived riskiness is high. Since plan members cannot “vote with their feet,” they have to 
resort to other measures to change their risk exposure if their pension fund does not deliver. 
They can, for instance, change their private pension savings (i.e., in the third pillar of the 
pension system), but they can also change the asset allocation of their private savings and 
investments and even adjust their retirement age.10 The latter two behavioral responses are 
the focus of this paper. 
 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. The DHS 
 
Our main source of data is the DHS, an Internet survey of a representative panel of Dutch 
households collected by CentERdata since 1993. The DHS currently surveys around 2,000 
Dutch households each year. CentERdata provides participating households with an Internet 
connection, a television, and a set-top box for the television to facilitate survey response. All 
persons aged 16 and over within each household are invited to take part in the survey. This 
study uses the 2007 through 2011 waves. 
To analyze portfolio decisions, we focus on equity investments. We define equity as the 
sum of direct stockholdings, mutual funds, and options. The other components of household 
financial wealth are checking, saving, and deposit accounts; government and municipal 
                                                 
10 This feature does not mean that our analysis is exclusive to the Netherlands. Our results apply to any legislation in which 
the costs of switching pension funds (either monetary, legal, or in terms of time) are high enough that people would rather 
reoptimize their individual portfolios and change their planned retirement age than go through the trouble of switching 
pension funds. Considering the decreasing costs of equity investments and the complexity involved in changing pension 
funds, rebalancing one’s individual portfolios may be the preferred choice for most DB fund participants. Changing the 
planned retirement age may carry additional psychological costs, though. 
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bonds; mortgage bonds; illiquid saving certificates; and other unspecified investments and 
savings. To analyze the decision to hold some equity—the extensive margin in portfolio 
choice—we create a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a person owns equity and 
zero otherwise. To analyze the intensive margins in portfolio choice, we use the share of 
total financial wealth invested in equity (bounded at zero and 100). 
To analyze the intended retirement age, we use the answers to the following question: 
“At what age do you expect to retire, or to make use of the early retirement arrangement?” 
For the extensive margin in individuals’ planned retirement age we create a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a person is planning to retire before the age of 65 and zero 
otherwise. This has typically been the retirement age in the Netherlands, although in 2007 
some disincentives were introduced for the early retirement of specific age cohorts. Our 
results are the same if we take these changes into account when constructing the early 
retirement dummy. For the intensive margin in individuals’ planned retirement age, we take 
the expected retirement age of the respondents (bounded at 99 by the answer categories in 
the survey). 
Throughout the analyses we control for education, wealth in durable assets, home 
ownership, risk preferences, income, age, gender, marital status, household composition, 
and labor market status. All these variables were taken from the DHS. Summary statistics 
for all the variables introduced above are presented in Table 1 for the DHS waves of 2007 
through 2011 and for our estimation sample. The estimation sample is similar to the DHS 
sample in most respects but is slightly wealthier and older, which in turn results in an 
underrepresentation of self-employed and unemployed people and an overrepresentation of 
married people and retirees. These small selectivity issues are probably due to survey 
answering behavior uncorrelated with our pension risk measure and are therefore unlikely to 
cause problems in our analyses. However, in Section 4.2 we show the heterogeneous effects 
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for each of these groups so that interested readers can judge for themselves what the likely 
bias due to sample selectivity might be. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.2. Pension fund performance data 
 
We measure the riskiness of each DB pension fund using the relation between their 
required funding ratio, as decreed by Dutch pension legislation, and their actual funding 
ratio. To match these data to the DHS, we use a survey question that asks the name of the 
pension fund to which each person contributes (for employees) or receives benefits from 
(for retirees). The estimation sample contains 31 different pension funds to which people 
contribute. We use the names of these pension funds to match the individual survey data 
with the required and actual funding ratios of each pension fund from 2007 through 2011. 
From this information we construct our measure of DB pension fund risk, our main 
regressor, as ܲ݁݊ݏ݅݋݊	ݎ݅ݏ݇ ൌ 	 ோ௘௤௨௜௥௘ௗ	௙௨௡ௗ௜௡௚	ି	௔௖௧௨௔௟	௙௨௡ௗ௜௡௚௔௖௧௨௔௟	௙௨௡ௗ௜௡௚ 	. High values of this measure 
indicate the relative strain of the pension fund’s financial position and therefore its riskiness. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of pension risk for both the entire sample of individual 
observations and the sample of pension funds observed in the data. From the figure it is 
clear that there are marked differences in exposure to pension risk. A large part of the 
observations fall above zero, meaning that actual funding is less than required. If we look at 
the changes in the distribution of pension risk over time, we see that in 2007 most funds’ 
actual funding was greater than required, but from 2008 onward this was reversed due to the 
financial crisis. In 2011, the average actual funding still fell short of the average required 
funding. 
The differences between both distributions in Figure 2 arise because people are not 
evenly distributed across sample pension funds. Most people in our samples contribute to 
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risker funds in our sample. However, this should not cause any problem with our 
identification strategy, since the distribution of perceived pension risk by individuals (left) 
maintains the general right-skewed risk distribution of the pension funds’ risk in our sample 
(right). Moreover, there are enough individual observations to identify the effects of pension 
risk throughout the relevant range of pension risk values. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.3. Econometric framework 
Our main analysis is based on four different empirical models—two for the extensive 
portfolio and retirement age margins and two for their intensive margins. All our models can 
be described in the simple form 
ݕ௜௧∗ ൌ 	ߚଵ݌݁݊ݏ݅݋݊	ݎ݅ݏ݇௜௧ ൅	ߚଶᇱ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߛ௝ ൅ ߠ௧ ൅	ߝ௜௧ 
where ݕ௜௧∗ 	is a latent dependent variable; ௜ܺ௧ is a set of controls; ߛ௝ and ߠ௧ are pension fund 
and year fixed effects, respectively; ߝ௜௧	is assumed to be a zero-mean, normally distributed 
error term; and our main parameter of interest is ߚଵ.11 For the extensive margins we use 
probit models to analyze the effect of pension risk on the decision to invest in equity and to 
retire early. Thus, for these models we observe ݕ௜௧ ൌ 1 if ݕ௜௧∗ ൐ 0 and zero otherwise. For 
the intensive margins we use Tobit models to analyze the effect of pension fund risk on 
individual portfolio shares in equity and on expected retirement age. Thus, for these models 
we observe ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݕ௎ if ݕ௜௧∗ ൒ ݕ௎, ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݕ௜௧∗  if ݕ௎ ൐ ݕ௜௧∗ ൐ ݕ௅, and ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݕ௅ if ݕ௜௧∗ ൑ ݕ௅. The 
Tobit models account for censoring at zero and 100 for the equity share (which occurs 
naturally) and right censoring at 99 for expected retirement age (which was imposed by the 
                                                 
11 There are no advantages to modeling the portfolio decisions and retirement age plans jointly. A bivariate probit model 
that allows the error term to be correlated across equations yields virtually identical coefficient estimates. The model 
cannot reject the null that ρ, the correlation coefficient between error terms, is zero. 
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survey). To facilitate the interpretation of our results, all the tables below report average 
marginal effects, which, for conciseness, we refer to as effects throughout Section 4, without 
any claim to their causality. 
In every regression the controls, ௜ܺ௧, include wealth (in the form of the log of wealth in 
durable assets and a dummy for home ownership), income, age, education, gender, and 
family composition. These controls are common in the literature on portfolio choice (e.g., 
Rosen and Wu, 2004; Hong et al., 2005; Guiso et al., 2008). We also include a measure of 
willingness to take on financial risk, a key determinant of portfolio choice. We control for 
differences in labor market status through dummy variables for self-employment, 
unemployment, and retirement. Note that the presence of ߛ௝ and ߠ௧ in our analyses means 
that the effect of pension fund risk is identified solely through within-pension fund 
variations in pension risk.12 
The fact that our estimation sample includes the crisis years requires special attention. 
During the crisis, especially between 2007 and 2008, the funding ratio of all the pension 
funds in our sample decreased. It is unclear how this common shock could affect the 
identification of our main results, especially since it is largely accounted for by ߠ௧. 
However, to show that this should not be an issue for our identification, we show the time 
evolution of pension risk for each pension fund and the variation used to identify our results 
in Figure 3. The left panel of Figure 3 shows the significant impact the financial crisis had 
on pension risk for all pension funds. However, the right panel, which plots the residuals of 
regressing pension risk by year and pension fund dummies (normalizing the starting point of 
the series at zero for 2007), shows that even after accounting for common year shocks and 
discarding between-pension fund variations, there is still substantial movement in our 
measure of pension risk. 
                                                 
12 Our main results are robust to various alternative specifications, with and without pension fund and year dummies. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A remaining estimation issue is the calculation of our standard errors. Since our main 
regressor, pension risk, has the same value within a given year and fund for every person, 
ordinary calculations of the standard errors could suffer from a downward bias (Moulton, 
1990). To account for this bias, we use robust standard errors for all the effects reported, 
clustered at the pension fund level.13 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Effects of pension fund risk 
 
Table 2 presents our main results. Column (1) shows that greater pension risk is 
negatively related to the decision to hold equity. Column (3) further shows that greater 
pension risk also decreases the share of wealth invested in equity. The interpretation is clear: 
People who perceive more risk in their pensions have less extensive and intensive 
investments in equity in their individual portfolios. 
The relation between pension fund risk and individual portfolio allocation is 
economically important. The marginal effects in Table 2 indicate the impact of a pension 
fund being roughly 1% more underfunded. To gain some perspective on the economic 
importance of these effects, note that the standard deviation of pension risk in our estimation 
sample is about 18.3 points. This means that the economic impact of a one standard 
deviation increase in pension risk can be estimated as 18.3 times the size of the marginal 
effects. So, bearing one standard deviation more pension risk causes one to be, on average, 
7.3 percentage points less likely to own equity (0.004*18.3) and to hold 3.6 percentage 
                                                 
13 The statistical significance of our main results holds if we use a cluster bootstrap t-procedure similar to that of Cameron 
et al. (2008) on average marginal effects. 
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points less wealth in equity (0.198*18.3). These effects are only slightly smaller than the 
impact of having a university education versus not finishing high school or of being a 
homeowner versus renting. To give our findings even more perspective, note that the 
unconditional chance of owning equity in our sample is only 26% and that average people 
hold only about 10.5% of their wealth in equity. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 2 show that pension risk has no effect on plans for early 
retirement or on expected retirement age, even though the signs of both effects are 
consistent with our hypothesis. Although these results are not what we expected, there are 
some possible explanations. It may simply be that people do not consider their retirement 
age as a mean to adjust for shocks in wealth variance, even though studies show that people 
adjust their expected retirement age to shocks in pension wealth related to changes in 
pension schemes (French, 2005; De Grip et al., 2012). It may also be that, due to 
psychological costs, changing one’s retirement age is more costly for people than adjusting 
their individual portfolios. Therefore, the entire adjustment to pension risk takes place at the 
portfolio level. There may also be a “bracketing” explanation: Losses brought on by 
additional pension risk are evaluated as financial losses and therefore people who suffer 
such a loss react primarily via financial instruments. Finally, a simpler explanation may be 
that the effects in the expected retirement equations are less precisely estimated because the 
expected retirement age is measured with more noise. 
Table 2 also shows the effects of other socioeconomic variables on equity investment and 
expected retirement. Having a university education increases investment in equity, 
consistent with fixed information and cognitive costs of investment in the stock market. It 
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also decreases the likelihood of expecting to retire early, which is consistent with a larger 
opportunity cost of early retirement for those with substantial human capital investments. 
Wealth in durable assets and home ownership increases investment in equity and decreases 
expected retirement, consistent with fixed monetary costs of equity investment, with 
housing being treated as a risk-free asset. Table 2 also shows that wealthier people with 
home equity, which can be used to fund their retirement consumption, retire earlier. 
Willingness to take on financial risk affects portfolio choice in the expected way and has 
minor effects on expected retirement, suggesting that early retirement is seen as a risky 
choice. Income has no effect on portfolio choice but is a strong predictor of expected 
retirement. This finding is consistent with the wealth effects discussed above and again 
shows that people are more willing to retire early if they are doing well financially.  
Age has a positive effect on equity investment. This effect is not due to the limited 
functional form in which age enters the estimation; we confirm positive age effects in 
unreported analyses using quadratic and cubic polynomials and non-parametric regressions. 
This result is at odds with lifecycle portfolio theory studies that predict individuals take on 
less financial risk as they age (e.g., Bodie et al., 1992). However, several empirical studies 
also show positive age effects on equity holding and share of wealth in equity (e.g., Donkers 
and van Soest, 1999; Poterba and Samwich, 2002; Kaustia and Torstila, 2011; van Rooij et 
al., 2011). Age is also positively related to early retirement expectations. However, this 
association is due to two relatively large jumps in early retirement expectations—one 
around the age of 25 and the other around 45—in an otherwise fairly flat age effect 
distribution. Expected retirement age also evolves rather flatly with age, with a mild upward 
trend after the age of 50. Furthermore, women plan to retire earlier than men and married 
people expect to retire earlier than single people. Retirees invest less in equity. 
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4.2. Identification through heterogeneous effects 
We have shown that pension risk has an important effect on individual equity allocations 
but no effect on expected retirement age. Since all our regressions include both year and 
pension fund fixed effects, we identify the effect of pension risk using only within-pension 
fund variations. Moreover, we control for a rich set of characteristics in all regressions. Still, 
one might wonder whether our measure of pension risk correctly captures what we want it 
to measure or whether our main effects are just driven by correlated factors that we do not 
observe. In this section we present various heterogeneous effects of pension fund risk that 
support the identification of our main results and provide some information on their drivers. 
For pension risk to affect behavior, people must be aware that such risk exists. Therefore, 
we should only expect to observe a change in behavior due to pension risk for people who 
are aware of their risk. We test this hypothesis using the answers to the following DHS 
question:  
A pension plan can include an arrangement for correcting the pension that can be 
claimed and/or the pension that is actually being paid according to a price-index 
and/or to a salary-index. Pensions that are corrected in this way are called indexed 
to inflation. Is your (future) retirement pension indexed to inflation? 
Answering this question with either yes or no suggests that the respondent is acquainted 
with the indexation conditions of his or her pension fund and therefore more likely to be 
aware of pension risk. Answering “I don’t know” suggests ignorance or disinterest in the 
topic and therefore unawareness of pension risk. Based on this intuition, we construct a 
dummy variable for pension risk awareness and calculate the heterogeneous effects of 
pension risk on this dummy via an interaction term.14 The corresponding effects for those 
                                                 
14 About 74% of our sample was aware of the indexation status of their pension funds. Section 4.3 presents evidence that 
people’s answers to this question are roughly consistent with what their pension fund performance would suggest about the 
indexation provided. 
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who are aware their pension risk and those who are not are presented in the top panel of 
Table 3. 
The results show that the mean effect of pension risk on equity investments is mainly 
driven by those who are aware of their pension risk. The size of the effect for these people is 
significantly larger than the size of the effect for unaware people. In addition, pension risk 
only has the expected sign for the expected retirement age equations for those who are 
aware of their pension risk. These results support the hypothesis that our main results reflect 
changes in individual behavior due to pension risk. 
We can also check the identification of our main results by looking at the behavior of 
retirees. As mentioned, in the Netherlands the inflation indexation policy of pension benefits 
is linked to the pension fund’s funding. Since pension income is naturally a more important 
source of income for retirees than for those still in the labor force, retirees should react more 
sharply to changes in pension fund risk. We test whether this is the case by calculating the 
effects of pension risk on equity investments for those in the labor force and retirees 
separately. The results, presented in the second panel of Table 3, show that pension fund 
risk has a stronger impact on the equity investment decisions of retirees, again supporting a 
behavioral change triggered by pension risk as the true source of our findings. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
4.3. Robustness analyses 
In this section we briefly describe the robustness checks we ran on our main results. 
Respectively, we tackle (1) the possibility that common stock market shocks affect both 
pension risk and individual portfolios, (2) the quality of our measure of pension risk 
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awareness, (3) the addition of retirement and housing wealth to the model, (4) the issue that 
pension fund mobility may be possible in spite of high costs, and (5) various other 
alternative model specifications. All the results in this section are shown in the Appendix. 
By and large, we conclude from this section that our main results hold. 
The first concern we address is the existence of common shocks to pension risk and 
people’s portfolios. In particular, we consider the possibility that a drop in stock prices 
could both increase pension risk and decrease people’s equity holdings (e.g., because people 
do not rebalance their portfolios that often). We do not think this to be likely, because of 
two reasons. First, for our main results to be entirely mechanical, we should not observe any 
effect of pension risk on equity participation. Second, generalized stock market shocks are 
largely accounted for by ߠ௧. Nevertheless, as an additional check, we include in our 
regressors each pension fund’s portfolio composition (their share of assets invested in 
equity, fixed income securities, real estate, and other investments). We report our results in 
Table A1. The effect of pension risk, which is almost identical to that of Table 2, now 
reflects differences in pension risk that are unrelated to the asset composition of the pension 
funds. This rules out any common shocks that could affect pension asset composition. 
A second concern is that the people who answered the pension indexation question may 
not know as much about their pension status as they claim. However, as Table A2 shows, 
when we compare pension risk and actual funding ratios for those who answered yes or no 
to the question “Is your (future) retirement pension indexed to inflation?” the pension funds 
of those who answered yes have significantly lower risk and have higher mean and median 
funding ratios. Moreover, the median funding for those who answered yes is well above the 
minimum required of 105%, whereas the median funding for those who said no is well 
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below. Our data thus suggest that our survey respondents are indeed aware and informed 
about their pension indexation status and pension risk.15 
A third concern is that some regressors in our main specification were not given enough 
attention or were not properly measured. In particular, this may be the case of pension and 
housing wealth: To the extent that these are correlated with pension risk, excluding them 
from the model may affect our main results. However, Tables A3 and A4 show that 
including these two regressors does not substantially change the main effects of pension 
risk.16 
A fourth concern is that, even though it is very costly for people to change pension funds, 
their dissatisfaction with their pension fund performance may be so severe that pushes them 
to change jobs or enter into self-employment or unemployment. Our data, however, show 
that this is not likely to be an issue: Table A5 shows that the probability of staying with the 
same pension fund from one year to the next is quite high, about 83%, and most of the 
pension fund changes are due to people changing jobs (since transition probability of being 
employed from one year to the next is about 97%). Moreover, the table also shows that 
when people change pension funds, they end up in funds that are, if anything, riskier. In 
view of this evidence, the hypothesis that labor market mobility may be related to pension 
risk seems very unlikely. 
                                                 
15 These results are perhaps less surprising in the Netherlands than in other countries. This is because the Dutch people 
who contribute (or have contributed in the past) to a pension fund receive an overview of their contributions that includes 
information about the fund’s performance. Moreover, the recent pension reform and other pension regulation changes and 
the fact that pension wealth is quite high in the Netherlands has spurred substantial press coverage of pension-related 
topics. 
16 Pension wealth is measured through the answer to the following question:  
“According to the overview, what will be your gross pension a year from age 65? For working people 
who are now connected to [a] pension fund: this refers to the amount you would get at age 65 if you 
stop working now.”  
This question is not nearly as odd as it sounds for a Dutch respondent; “pension income if quitting now” is explicitly 
reported in the pension overview sent to Dutch contributors each year. Housing wealth is measured by the original 
purchase price of the house as reported in the survey (we obtain similar results if we use the current estimated value of the 
house or province–year interaction fixed effects). These measures are not included in the main specification because they 
would have reduced the sample size considerably. 
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Finally, we tried various alternative model specifications and changes in the estimation 
method and our results were robust to them all. The results are reported in Table A6. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we show that individuals react to DB pension risk by rebalancing their 
individual portfolios. People who bear more pension risk are often less likely to hold any 
equity and also hold a lower share of their wealth in equity, on average. These relations are 
mainly driven by people who are more likely to be aware of their pension risk (i.e., those 
who reported knowing the indexation policy of their pension funds) and retirees, two groups 
that should be more affected according to our behavioral hypothesis. We also expected 
pension risk to be related to intended retirement age, but this hypothesis is not supported by 
our data. 
The recent literature on retirement portfolio choice states that people are ill equipped to 
make proper decisions about their retirement and have a preference for DB-type plans. Even 
so, Poterba et al. (2007) argue that DB plans are not the best choice for most people, since 
DC plans provide better retirement conditions in almost every case. Our results contest this 
hypothesis. We show that people with DB plans adjust their individual portfolios in reaction 
to their DB pension risk, which suggests that people are maximizing the risk–return trade-
off in their total portfolio, even though they cannot directly influence their risk exposure 
through their pension savings. A well-funded DB pension system would therefore allow 
people to obtain higher returns through their individual portfolios while relieving less 
sophisticated investors from the portfolio decisions entailed in a DC system. This system 
improves the welfare of employees and retirees alike, since DB and hybrid DB schemes do 
relieve some of the participants’ risk compared to DC plans. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of the main variables for the DHS 2007–2011 observations 
and the estimation sample 
 
 
 
  DHS 2007–2011   Estimation sample 
  Obs.  Mean Std. dev.   Obs. Mean Std. dev.  
                
Holds equity 5,779 0.21 0.41   2,958 0.26 0.44 
Equity share of wealth 5,779 8.97 22.09   2,958 10.47 22.87 
Plans to retire early 3,151 0.32 0.47   1,817 0.45 0.50 
Expected (early) retirement age 3,230 70.43 13.74   1,817 67.21 11.03 
                
Total wealth (1,000 euros) 7,003 51.06 153.86   2,958 63.10 148.92 
Total durable assets value (1,000 euros) 6,841 16.09 88.27   2,958 17.86 65.61 
Lives in own house 15,105 0.79 0.41   2,958 0.77 0.42 
High school degree 15,054 0.39 0.49   2,958 0.33 0.47 
University or college degree 15,054 0.30 0.46   2,958 0.46 0.50 
Gross income (1,000 euros) 5,700 27.03 24.85   2,958 35.17 20.07 
Age 14,321 47.57 17.44   2,958 55.81 13.89 
Female 15,105 0.53 0.50   2,958 0.39 0.49 
Married 15,111 0.52 0.50   2,958 0.73 0.45 
Willingness to take on financial risk 6,476 2.70 1.03   2,958 2.61 1.01 
Number of people in household 15,105 2.94 1.31   2,958 2.37 1.16 
Self-employed 15,105 0.06 0.24   2,958 0.01 0.09 
Unemployed 15,105 0.02 0.13   2,958 0.01 0.09 
Retired 15,105 0.16 0.36   2,958 0.33 0.47 
25 
 
Table 2: Main effects of pension fund risk on household portfolio holdings and planned 
retirement age 
 
 
  Probit models   Tobit models 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable =  Holds equity 
Plans to 
retire early   
Equity 
share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
            
Pension risk -0.004** -0.000   -0.198** 0.041 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.083) (0.054) 
            
High school degree -0.012 -0.064*   -1.388 0.151 
  (0.037) (0.033)   (1.553) (1.222) 
University or college degree 0.081** -0.092***   3.131* 0.287 
  (0.038) (0.022)   (1.858) (0.732) 
Log of durable assets 0.009*** 0.009***   0.286*** -0.146** 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.102) (0.061) 
Lives in own house 0.095*** 0.114***   4.451*** -2.615*** 
  (0.025) (0.036)   (1.080) (0.640) 
Willingness to take on financial risk 0.123*** 0.014*   5.973*** -0.190 
  (0.010) (0.008)   (0.507) (0.258) 
Log of income 0.016 0.094***   0.570 -3.590*** 
  (0.010) (0.019)   (0.459) (0.421) 
Age 0.005*** 0.003***   0.295*** 0.080*** 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.046) (0.025) 
Female -0.015 0.085***   0.123 -0.013 
  (0.010) (0.033)   (0.493) (0.689) 
Married 0.007 0.169***   -0.101 -0.639 
  (0.026) (0.022)   (0.965) (0.675) 
Number of people in household -0.005 -0.001   -0.228 -0.456*** 
  (0.007) (0.007)   (0.285) (0.154) 
Self-employed -0.162 -0.028   -7.961 0.513 
  (0.117) (0.128)   (5.017) (3.116) 
Unemployed -0.004 -0.082   -0.411 4.162 
  (0.094) (0.119)   (4.433) (2.851) 
Retired -0.102***     -4.734***   
  (0.023)     (0.996)   
            
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Pension fund fixed effects  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
            
Observations 2,958 1,811   2,958 1,817 
Standard errors clustered at the pension fund level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
All columns report average marginal effects. The small difference in the number of observations between 
columns (2) and (4) arises because the probit model drops a small pension fund fixed effect that perfectly 
predicts the outcome.  
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Table 3: Heterogeneous effects of pension fund risk by retirement status and pension 
indexation knowledge 
 
 
 
  Probit models   Tobit models 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable = Holds equity 
Plans to 
retire 
early 
  Equity share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
            
  Effect of pension risk for people: 
            
Unaware of pension risk -0.003* 0.001   -0.131* -0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.077) (0.050) 
Aware of pension risk -0.004** -0.000   -0.227*** 0.066 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.087) (0.053) 
            
Observations 2,958 1,811   2,958 1,817 
Difference test (p-value) 0.032 0.251   0.006 0.003 
  
Holds 
equity 
Plans to 
retire 
early 
  Equity share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
  (1) (3)   (4) (6) 
            
  Effect of pension risk for: 
            
People still in labor force -0.003* -   -0.166** - 
  (0.002)     (0.077)   
Retirees -0.005** -   -0.287** - 
  (0.002)     (0.116)   
            
Observations 2,958 -   2,958 - 
Difference test (p-value) 0.101 -   0.058 - 
Standard errors clustered at the pension fund level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. The effects of the first panel are derived from probit and Tobit regressions that interact a pension 
risk-aware dummy with pension risk. The effects of the second panel are derived from probit and 
Tobit regressions that interact a retired dummy with pension risk. Naturally, for the second panel, 
Columns (3) and (4) are not estimable. All columns report average marginal effects. All regressions 
include the same control variables as reported in Table 2 and include year and pension fund fixed 
effects. 
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Figure 1: Typical indexation policy ladder for a Dutch pension fund 
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Figure 2: Distribution of pension fund risk for sample individuals and pension funds  
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Figure 3: Evolution of pension risk over time and its variation after accounting for 
pension fund and year effects 
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Appendix 
 
 
Figure A1: Distributions of actual and required funding 
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Table A1: Main effects of pension fund risk, controlling for pension fund asset 
allocation 
 
 
  Probit models   Tobit models 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable =  Holds equity 
Plans to 
retire early   Equity share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
            
Pension risk -0.003* -0.001   -0.176** 0.021 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.081) (0.062) 
            
P. fund share in equity -0.000 0.000   0.016 -0.020 
  (0.003) (0.006)   (0.165) (0.098) 
P. fund share in fixed income -0.002 0.007   -0.095 0.057 
  (0.002) (0.005)   (0.136) (0.066) 
P. fund share in real estate 0.001 -0.000   -0.074 -0.155* 
  (0.004) (0.008)   (0.228) (0.087) 
P. fund share in other investments -0.002 -0.023   -0.146 -0.146 
  (0.009) (0.015)   (0.421) (0.367) 
            
Other controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Pension fund fixed effects  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
            
Observations 2,958 1,811   2,958 1,817 
Standard errors clustered at the pension fund level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All 
columns report average marginal effects. Other controls include all regressors reported in Table 2. 
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Table A2: Pension risk and funding and pension indexation beliefs 
 
 
 
 
  Pension risk   Actual funding 
  Mean Median   Mean Median 
Is your pension inflation-
indexed?           
            
Yes (n=1,862) 13.44 18.95   1.11 1.04 
No (n=339) 14.12 26.54   1.01 0.96 
            
p-value of difference <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
The tests include only observations of individuals who claim to know whether their 
pensions are indexed or not. The tests of differences in means are performed with 
clustered standard errors at the pension fund level. The median differences are tested 
using the K-sample non-parametric test. 
 
  
33 
 
Table A3: Main effects of pension fund risk, controlling for current pension wealth 
 
 
  Probit models   Tobit models 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable =  Holds equity 
Plans to 
retire early   
Equity 
share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
            
Pension risk -0.006** 0.006   -0.279*** -0.114* 
  (0.003) (0.004)   (0.089) (0.068) 
            
Log hopusehold income if retiring now 0.013*** 0.005   0.577*** -0.270** 
  (0.003) (0.009)   (0.159) (0.122) 
            
Other controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Pension fund fixed effects  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
            
Observations 1,345 866   1,373 879 
Standard errors clustered at the pension fund level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All 
columns report average marginal effects. Other controls include all regressors reported in Table 2. 
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Table A4: Main effects of pension fund risk, controlling for housing wealth 
 
 
 
  Probit models   Tobit models 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable =  Holds equity 
Plans to 
retire 
early 
  Equity share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
Without housing wealth:           
Pension risk -0.003 0.000   -0.151 -0.025 
  (0.002) (0.004)   (0.093) (0.068) 
            
With housing wealth:           
Pension risk -0.003 -0.000   -0.161* -0.018 
  (0.002) (0.004)   (0.095) (0.067) 
            
Log of house purchase value 0.069*** -0.075*   3.376*** 1.258* 
  (0.022) (0.040)   (1.141) (0.690) 
            
Other controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Pension fund fixed effects  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
            
Observations 1,707 983   1,707 1,001 
Standard errors clustered at the pension fund level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1. All columns report average marginal effects. Other controls include all 
regressors reported in Table 2. 
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Table A5: Transition probabilities of the pension fund and labor market status and 
pension risk before and after changes 
 
 
Pension fund transition (n=1,412) 
    A B       
A Remains in P. fund 83.68 16.32       
B Changed P. fund 78.08 21.92       
Employment transition (n=1,412) 
    1 2 3 4 9 
1 Employed 97.03 0.13 0.26 2.33 0.26 
2 Self-employed 2.13 95.74 0 0 2.13 
3 Unemployed 20 0 70 10 0 
4 Retired 0 0 0.19 99.81 0 
9 Other 1.67 1.67 0 1.67 95 
Before and after pension fund change 
    
Year 
before 
changing 
Year 
after 
change       
  Mean of:           
              
  Pension risk 10.73 15.04       
  Actual funding 1.13 1.07       
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Table A6: Main effects of pension risk under alternative specifications 
 
 
  Probit models   Tobit models 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Dependent variable =  Holds equity 
Plans to 
retire early   
Equity 
share 
Exp. 
retirement 
age  
            
Specification: The marginal effect of pension risk: 
            
a) Inverse probability weighting -0.003** 0.000   -0.169** -0.006 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.069) (0.131) 
Observations 2,924 1,799   2,938 1,806 
            
b) Heteroskedastic models -0.003** -0.000   - - 
  (0.001) (0.001)   - - 
Observations 2,958 1,811   - - 
            
c) Lag in pension risk -0.003*** -0.001   -0.154*** 0.039 
  (0.001) (0.003)   (0.057) (0.047) 
Observations 1,795 1,069   1,833 1,076 
            
d) No control variables -0.003* -0.001   -0.151* 0.057 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.083) (0.057) 
Observations 2,958 1,673   2,958 1,678 
            
e) No largest pension fund -0.004*** 0.001   -0.229*** 0.042 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.065) (0.059) 
Observations 1,678 1,125   1,699 1,131 
            
f) No fixed effects -0.001** -0.002***   -0.076*** 0.007 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.026) (0.015) 
Observations 2,958 1,678   2,958 1,678 
            
g) Individual means -0.002*** -0.001   -0.092*** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001)   (0.026) (0.013) 
Observations 1,696 1,075   1,699 1,081 
a) The variables in the first-stage probit regression (z) include gender, age, times reported wealth in 
sample, times reported unemployed in sample, times changed occupation in sample, detailed education, 
detailed occupation, marital status, household members, main earner, and year fixed effects. 
b) All the regressors, except pension fund and year fixed effects, are used to predict the variance of the 
error term. 
d) These regressions include only year and pension fund fixed effects. 
e) These regressions exclude the largest pension fund (42% of our main sample) from the estimation. 
f) These regressions include only the control variables reported in Table 2. 
e) These regressions are on collapsed data by individual and include median pension fund fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at the pension fund level are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. All columns report average marginal effects. 
 
